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In this paper, I analyze India’s approach to capital account liberalization through the lens of the new
literature on financial globalization. India’s authorities have taken a cautious and calibrated path to
capital account opening, which has served the economy well in terms of reducing its vulnerability
to crises. By now, the capital account has become quite open and reversing this is not a viable option.
Moreover, the remaining capital controls are rapidly becoming ineffective, making the debate about
capital controls rather moot. Managing de facto financial integration into international capital markets
and aligning domestic macroeconomic policies in a manner that maximizes the indirect benefits and
reduces the risks is the key challenge now facing India’s policymakers on this front.
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I. Introduction 
 
Capital account liberalization remains a highly contentious issue. Proponents argue that it 
fosters financial globalization—a term that broadly encompasses cross-border flows of 
financial capital in various forms. This phenomenon, in principle, should allow for a more 
efficient allocation of financial resources across countries and also permit countries to 
share their country-specific income risk more efficiently, thereby increasing economic 
welfare on both counts. Detractors have blamed capital account liberalization as being the 
root cause of the financial crises experienced by many countries and argue that the deck is 
particularly stacked against non-industrial countries, which have experienced few benefits 
but exposed themselves to considerable risks (see, e.g., Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998).  
 
The recent financial crisis has brought this debate into even sharper relief. Emerging 
market economies and even some low-income countries are having to cope with volatile 
capital flows—sharp surges in inflows in the last couple of years followed by outflows in 
recent months. Before the crisis hit, major economies like China and India were 
contemplating further opening of their capital accounts, generating a sharp polemical 
debate about the advisability of this strategy.  
 
Meanwhile, there have been important advances in the academic literature. Even before the 
recent crisis, researchers had begun to develop a more nuanced approach to the issue and to 
frame the debate in terms of a complex set of cost-benefit tradeoffs. One of the key 
conclusions of the new literature is that the principal benefit of financial openness for 
developing economies may not be access to foreign capital that helps increase domestic 
investment by relaxing the constraint imposed by a low level of domestic saving. Rather, 
the main benefits may be indirect ones associated with openness to foreign capital, 
including the catalytic effects of foreign finance on domestic financial market 
development, enhanced discipline on macroeconomic policies, and improvements in 
corporate governance as well as other aspects of institutional quality. 
   2 
A major complication, however, is that economies that have weak initial conditions in 
certain dimensions seem to have much worse outcomes from their integration into 
international financial markets, in terms of both lower benefits and higher risks. For 
countries below these “threshold” conditions, the benefit-risk tradeoff becomes 
complicated and a one-shot approach to capital account liberalization may be risky and 
counter-productive. Some of these threshold conditions (e.g., level of financial 
development, quality of domestic institutions) are similar to the list of indirect benefits, 
pointing to a difficult tension faced by low- and middle-income countries that want to use 
financial openness as a catalyst for those benefits but would then face the risks associated 
with being below the threshold conditions.  
 
At the same time, the practical reality is that emerging market countries are having to adapt 
to rising financial globalization. Capital controls are being rendered increasingly 
ineffective by the rising sophistication of international investors, the sheer quantity of 
money flowing across national borders, and the increasing number of channels (especially 
expanding trade flows) for the evasion of these controls. Hence, emerging market 
economies like China and India are perforce grappling with the new realities of financial 
globalization, wherein capital controls are losing their potency as a policy instrument (or at 
least as an instrument that creates more room for monetary and other macro policies). 
 
Developments in international financial markets also have a bearing on this issue. In recent 
years, emerging markets had been getting more capital inflows than they could 
comfortably handle, causing complications for domestic macroeconomic policies and also 
exposing these economies even more to the volatility of foreign capital. International 
investors, especially from industrial economies, had turned up in droves at the shores of 
emerging markets in recent years but are now retreating due to the recent global financial 
turmoil. It is likely that, once financial markets settle down, they will again be lured by the 
strong growth prospects of many emerging markets as well as weak growth and low 
interest rates in their home countries. The same forces are also likely to cause domestic 
investors in emerging markets to resume repatriation of their capital from abroad.  
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Against this background, the objective of this paper is to analyze India’s approach to 
capital account liberalization program through the lens of the new literature on financial 
globalization. In recent years, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has taken what it calls a 
calibrated approach to capital account liberalization, with certain types of flows and 
particular classes of economic agents being prioritized in the process of liberalization (see 
Reddy, 2007). I will evaluate the effectiveness of this approach in terms of the narrow 
objectives of influencing the quantity and composition of flows, and also in terms of 
macroeconomic consequences. This will involve an empirical characterization of the 
evolution of financial openness based on de jure measures of capital account openness as 
well as de facto measures of financial integration. I will also examine the evolution and 
structure of inflows and outflows. I will then relate these to the literature on the 
determinants and effects of external capital structure. 
 
The cautious and calibrated approach has meant that India’s capital account liberalization 
has proceeded in fits and starts but the net effect is that, over time, the capital account has 
become increasingly open and India has been rapidly integrating into international capital 
markets. While this approach has to some extent helped protect the country from the 
volatility induced by financial flows, a key question is whether this approach may have 
subtle costs in terms of efficiency and welfare that outweigh this benefit.  
 
In the next section, I provide an overview of the new literature on the benefits and risks of 
financial globalization. In Section III, I describe the evolution of India’s financial openness 
based on a wide range of indicators. In the subsequent three sections, I provide a detailed 
analysis of the structure of and changes in India’s balance of payments, cross-border 
financial flows, and international reserves. In the final section of the paper, I discuss the 
implications of India’s approach towards capital account liberalization for monetary and 
exchange rate policies and for financial sector reforms.  
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II. Paradoxical Results, But Composition of Liabilities Matters 
 
Despite the strong theoretical presumption that financial openness should boost growth in 
developing countries, macroeconomic evidence of the growth benefits of financial 
openness remains elusive (see Kose et al., 2006; Kletzer IPF 2005 for surveys). Although 
there is a positive correlation between measures of financial openness and growth, this 
correlation vanishes once one controls for other determinants of growth such as financial 
development, quality of institutions, and macroeconomic policies. More recent evidence 
based on better measures of de facto financial openness or specific types of liberalization 
(such as equity market liberalizations) does show more positive effects. Analysis based on 
industry- or firm-level data is also more supportive of the efficiency and growth benefits of 
financial globalization. But this evidence is hardly conclusive.  
 
Indeed, there is some remarkable new evidence that non-industrial countries that rely less 
on foreign capital have on average posted better long-run growth outcomes (see Aizenman, 
Pinto and Radziwill, 2008; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2007; Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian, 
2007). This result is not just limited to the recent period of rising global imbalances, when 
some fast-growing economies like China have on net been exporting massive amounts of 
capital. This result holds up over much longer periods of time and is not specific to 
countries in any particular region. Rodrik (2008) interprets these new findings as 
suggesting that the real constraint to growth in many less-developed economies is 
investment not savings. Ineffectual financial systems may not be up to the task of 
efficiently intermediating domestic savings into investment, let alone being able to 
intermediate foreign capital efficiently.  
 
Given these empirical findings, a new paradigm is emerging that the main benefits of 
financial globalization may not be through the direct channel of providing more financing. 
Rather, the main benefits may be in terms of catalyzing financial market and institutional 
development, stimulating gains in efficiency through competition and access to new 
technologies, and disciplining macroeconomic policies (see Schematic 1). There is   5 
accumulating evidence for this paradigm, although it is by no means conclusive yet.
1 
Nevertheless, this paradigm has important implications for empirical analysis of the effects 
of capital account liberalization and also for designing such liberalization programs. 
 
A complication, however, is that there appear to be some threshold conditions that 
influence the cost-benefit tradeoff. Indeed, factors such as financial market development 
and the quality of institutions also seem to play a crucial role in determining the extent of 
benefits a country can derive from financial openness and also how vulnerable it is to the 
risks associated with capital flows. These thresholds are considerably lower for certain 
types of financial flows—FDI and portfolio equity, in particular—and higher for debt 
inflows.
2 Indeed, there are many examples of how underdeveloped or poorly regulated 
financial markets and weak institutions can interact in ways that result in misallocation of 
foreign capital and make countries vulnerable to financial crises.
3 
 
This framework clearly highlights some deep tensions in the process of capital account 
liberalization that cannot easily be avoided. But the collateral benefits-thresholds 
framework also suggests a way forward. If one can prioritize the indirect “collateral” 
benefits that a country needs, it should in principle be possible to undertake a controlled 
capital account liberalization that helps attain these benefits while reducing the risks. Thus, 
the framework encompasses a general approach that can still take account of country-
                                                 
1 Kose et al. (2006) develop this framework and survey the evidence on each of these potential 
indirect (or “collateral”) benefits. There is a growing body of evidence—based on country case 
studies as well as cross-country analysis using both macroeconomic and microeconomic (firm- and 
sector-level) data—that financial openness tends to positively influence financial development and 
institutional quality. The evidence that it boosts macroeconomic discipline remains sparse, 
however. For skeptical views about the notion that financial integration delivers such indirect 
benefits, see Eichengreen (2007) and Rodrik and Subramanian (2008).  
2 Kose, Prasad and Taylor (2008) review the theoretical basis for such threshold effects and 
provide some quantitative evidence that thresholds matter, even though it proves difficult to pin 
down precisely the exact levels of various thresholds. Mukerji (2009) provides evidence that higher 
levels of financial development and stable macroeconomic policies enable countries to gain modest 
growth benefits from capital account convertibility, while weak financial systems and 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities increase growth instability without raising average growth.  
3 See Krueger and Yoo (2002) and Desai (2003) for interesting narrative accounts.     6 
specific circumstances and initial conditions. For instance, Prasad and Rajan (2008) 
propose a method for countries experiencing sustained large inflows to securitize their 
reserve accumulation. This would, in a controlled way, help balance the inflows by 
encouraging outflows, and would deliver the indirect benefits of broadening financial 





It is also worth considering other potential benefits of financial openness rather than just its 
effects on GDP growth. One of the main presumed benefits of international financial 
integration is that it should facilitate international trade in financial assets, thereby enabling 
countries to diversify away their income risk and thereby smooth their consumption 
growth. Remarkably, the evidence shows that financial integration has, on average, led to 
worse risk sharing outcomes for emerging market economies during the period of 
globalization. Only industrial countries have been able to more efficiently share risk 
through the process of financial integration. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007) document 
these patterns in the data. They also probe more deeply into why financial integration 
seems to hurt emerging markets on this dimension.  
 
They find that stocks of FDI and portfolio equity liabilities are in fact associated with 
better risk sharing outcomes while stocks of external debt liabilities are not. Indeed, this 
goes a long way towards explaining the paradoxical outcomes for emerging markets. Until 
recently, financial integration for these economies largely took place in the form of debt 
accumulation. Not only are debt flows themselves procyclical, interest payments on 
external debt are typically not indexed to the business cycle, so they have a procyclical 
element to them as well. FDI and portfolio equity flows by their very nature involve a 
sharing of risk between foreign investors and their host countries. They have also tended to 
be more stable than debt flows. Interestingly, advanced economies do not seem to suffer 
similar problems from debt flows, which still dominate cross-border flows among these 
economies. This could be because they have better-developed financial markets and,   7 
typically, more flexible exchange rates, both of which act as shock absorbers in the face of 




The literature about the indirect benefits of financial integration emphasizes that the main 
benefits of financial integration are in terms of TFP growth. Interestingly, while there has 
been a vast literature examining the effects of integration on output growth, scant attention 
has been paid to its effects on TFP growth. In a recent contribution, Kose, Prasad and 
Terrones (2008) find that de jure capital account openness is positively associated with 
TFP growth. Surprisingly, however, overall de facto financial integration is not correlated 
with TFP growth. This turns out to mask a novel and interesting result. FDI and portfolio 
equity liabilities are in fact associated with much higher productivity growth, while stocks 
of debt liabilities are negatively correlated with TFP growth, especially in economies with 
underdeveloped financial systems. What explains this difference? The indirect “collateral” 
benefits of financial flows tend to flow from FDI, in terms of technological and skill 
spillovers, and from portfolio equity, in the form of increased depth and innovations in 
equity markets. Financial sector FDI has also been found to help in the import of good 
governance practices and financial innovations (Goldberg, 2004).  
 
A common theme that emerges from this new literature is that, in terms of evaluating the 
potential benefits and risks of financial integration, the composition of the stock of external 
liabilities is highly relevant in a number of dimensions. This is of course not a big 
surprise—for instance, it is in line with the earlier literature on sequencing of capital 
account liberalization. But it is nevertheless comforting that some of the theoretical 
predictions about the benefits of financial integration can be recovered with a suitable 
disaggregation of the data.  
 
This brief overview of the new literature on the benefits and costs of financial openness 
will help us in understanding the implications of India’s rising financial openness. To 
begin with, we need to know how open India’s capital account actually is.    8 
III. How Open is India’s Capital Account 
 
The traditional approach to measuring financial openness is to use measures of legal 
restrictions on cross-border capital flows. The conventional binary indicator of capital 
account openness is based on information contained in the International Monetary Fund’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) for 
each of the IMF’s member countries (Schindler, 2007). Authors such as Miniane (2004), 
Chinn and Ito (2006), and Edwards (2007) have developed finer measures of capital 
account openness using disaggregated information from the AREAER.
4 
 
An alternative approach is to use a de facto measure that tries to take into account how 
much a country is integrated into international capital markets in practice.
5 A measure of 
gross flows as a ratio to GDP captures two-way flows, which one would expect to see if 
economies were in fact sharing risk efficiently in a world with multiple financial 
instruments and agents with different risk profiles. Using the sum of gross inflows and 
outflows as a ratio to national GDP also yields a nice symmetry with the widely-used 
measure of trade openness, which is the sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP.  
 
However, such annual flows tend to be quite volatile and are prone to measurement error. 
To mitigate (but obviously not eliminate) these problems, Kose et al. (2008) propose using 
the sum of gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. For some 
purposes--particularly risk sharing--the stock measures are more appropriate. For instance, 
if countries have large gross stocks of assets and liabilities, small exchange rate changes 
can have large valuation effects and serve as a mechanism for risk-sharing even if net asset 
positions are small. For emerging market countries, another relevant measure of de facto 
financial integration is the ratio of gross stocks of external liabilities to GDP—a cumulated 
                                                 
4 See Mohan (2008, Annex 1) for a comprehensive listing of capital controls still in place in India.  
5 Another approach has been to look at price-based measures of asset market integration. However, 
there are serious practical problems in using such measures for developing economies. Returns on 
financial instruments in those economies may incorporate a multitude of risk and liquidity premia 
that are difficult to disentangle. Even interest parity conditions sometimes do not hold because of 
inefficiencies and lack of depth in some of these markets.    9 
measure of inflows that is most closely related to the notion of openness to foreign capital 
that could be associated with technological and other spillovers. We take these measures of 
de facto financial integration from the widely-used database created by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006).  
 
There is important information in both the de jure and de facto measures. De jure measures 
are relevant for analysis of the effects of capital account liberalization policies. But the 
existence of capital controls often does not accurately capture an economy’s actual level of 
integration into international financial markets. These measures do not capture the degree 
of enforcement of capital controls (or the effectiveness of that enforcement), which can 
change over time even if the legal restrictions themselves remain unchanged. Many 
countries with extensive capital controls have still experienced massive outflows of private 
capital, while some economies with open capital accounts have recorded few capital 
inflows or outflows. For instance, despite its extensive regime of capital controls, China 
has not been able to block inflows of speculative capital in recent years (Prasad and Wei, 
2007). A further complication is that, despite the extensive coverage of the IMF’s annual 
AREAER publication, there could be other regulations that effectively act as capital 
controls but are not counted as controls. For instance, prudential regulations that limit the 
foreign exchange exposure of domestic banks could, under certain circumstances, have the 
same effect as capital controls. 
 
The de facto measure may be conceptually more appropriate to the extent that one is 
interested in the effects of an outcome-based measure of financial integration. On the other 
hand, many of the indirect benefits of financial integration may be vitiated by the presence 
of capital controls. Efficiency gains from competition, technology transfers, spillovers of 
good corporate and public governance practices etc. may be associated with an open 
capital account. Inward flows that manage to circumvent capital account restrictions are 
much less likely to convey many of the indirect benefits of financial integration. Many 
authors have also pointed out that capital controls can impose significant distortionary 
costs at the microeconomic (firm or industry) level, even if economic agents find ways to 
evade those controls (see the survey by Forbes, 2005).    10 
How does India stack up on these different measures of financial openness? Table 1 
presents some summary statistics on each of the measures of de jure capital account 
openness discussed above at different points of time. For each measure and each date, the 
table shows the median value for the full sample of countries, different values for emerging 
market countries, and the value assigned to India. By any of these measures, it looks like 
India is at the low end of the distribution of the respective capital account openness 
measure in 1995. There is a trend increase over time in average capital account openness 
for the full sample of countries. By 2005, India remains near the bottom of the distribution 
of Chinn-Ito measures but moves up significantly per the Edwards measure.
6 These are all 
relatively crude measures of de jure openness, based on a reading of the IMF’s annual 
AREAER reports on each country. But in India’s case they do signal that there are some 
restrictions on capital account transactions even in categories of flows that have been 
liberalized (even minimal registration requirements do get counted as restrictions). 
 
More substantively, the RBI has in fact eased a number of controls, both on inflows and 
outflows. For instance, although capital outflows by individuals are in principle still 
restricted, each individual is allowed to take up to $200,000 of capital out of India each 
year, a generous ceiling by any standards.
7 The restrictions on outflows by Indian 
corporates are even weaker. As for inflows, FDI inflows into certain sectors such as retail 
and banking are restricted, and foreign investors are not allowed to participate in the 
government debt market. These restrictions are gradually being lifted. Equity market 
investments are permitted by registered foreign institutional investors (although there are 
limits on their ownership shares in certain types of Indian firms), and those who do not 
                                                 
6 A different measure of de jure capital account openness is the equity market liberalization 
indicator created and used by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000). This is considered a 
one-off liberalization that occurs when domestic equity markets are opened up to foreign investors. 
These authors list India as having liberalized its equity markets in 1992 (and China as having done 
so in 1994).  
7 There are a few minor and relatively innocuous restrictions on these outflows (e.g., money cannot 
be taken abroad without RBI permission for margin calls; to a small group of neighboring 
countries; and to countries identified as not cooperating with international anti-money laundering 
regulations).    11 
wish to register can invest only indirectly through an instrument called participatory notes, 
which are tightly regulated by the government.  
 
We now turn to India’s de facto integration with international capital markets. Figure 1 
shows that gross external liabilities, gross external assets, and the sum of these two 
variables (expressed as ratios to GDP) have all increased significantly in recent years, 
indicative of the rapid pace at which India has been integrating into international capital 
markets. From 1980 to the mid-1990s, the total integration measure rose by about 25 
percentage points, with almost this entire increase accounted for by an increase in external 
liabilities. In the mid-1980s, especially with the onset of the Asian financial crisis, de facto 
integration leveled off, although it is interesting to note that foreign assets continued to 
increase gradually during this period. From 2000 to 2006, the integration measure shot up 
by nearly 26 percentage points, with accumulation of external liabilities and assets 
accounting in almost equal part for this increase.  
 
Nevertheless, on a cross-country comparison and relative to its size, India appears to have 
one of the least financially open economies amongst the group of emerging markets. 
Figure 2 shows that India was near the bottom of the distribution of the preferred de facto 
integration measure; its relative position among emerging markets remains quite stable 
despite the rapid increase in its absolute level of integration. Thus, in terms of both de jure 
and de facto measures, India’s low level of financial openness puts it well below the levels 
attained by most other emerging market economies, including the other large BRIC 
economies—Brazil, China and Russia. This perspective is useful to keep in mind while 
discussing whether India has exposed itself to considerable risks from rapid integration 
into international capital markets. 
 
IV. The Balance of Payments 
 
In order to dissect the forces behind the accumulation of foreign assets and liabilities, we 
now turn to an analysis of the underlying flows. India’s engagement with the world 
economy through both trade and financial linkages can best be seen through the prism of   12 
the balance of payments. There have been dramatic changes in the evolution of India’s 
balance of payments since the currency crisis of the early 1990s (Table 2). During and 
right after the period of the Asian financial crisis, the current account and capital account 
roughly balanced each other. In the early part of this decade, the current account balance 
turned slightly positive, despite a trade deficit. Indeed, this has been a consistent story in 
India during this decade—that the trade deficit has been offset to a considerable extent by a 
surplus on invisibles trade and remittances from Indian workers abroad.  
 
Reserve accumulation gradually picked up speed during the early 2000s. There has been a 
marked shift in the structure of the balance of payments during the last two years (2006-07 
and 2007-08). The merchandise trade deficit has risen sharply (to 8 percent of GDP) and 
the current account deficit is now 1.5 percent of GDP, both larger than at any other time 
during the past decade. But large capital inflows have more than offset the current account 
deficit, leading to rapid reserve accumulation.  
 
At the end of financial year 2008, gross international reserves stood at $310 billion, 
representing about 27 percent of nominal GDP. Figure 3 shows that reserve accumulation 
has hardly been a steady and unrelenting process in India (unlike in China, where it has). 
There were a number of months, even during this period of unprecedented reserve 
accumulation, when reserves actually fell. But the overall trend until the summer of 2008 
was clearly one of not just a rising level of reserves but also a rising pace of reserve 
accumulation. The global financial turmoil that swept on to India’s shores in September 
2008 led to depreciation pressures on the rupee and the RBI has used up about $30 billion 
of its stock of reserves to limit the depreciation of the rupee. It is too early to tell if the era 
of large capital inflows to India is past or if inflows will recover when the global financial 
system settles down.  
 
It is instructive to break down the reserve buildup into its components to examine what 
factors can explain the increase in the rate of accumulation. For this exercise, I split the 
nine-year period since the Asian financial crisis into three periods: 1998-99 to 2000-01; 
2001-02 to 2005-06; and 2005-06 to 2007-08. For many Asian and other emerging market   13 
economies, the pace and sources of reserve accumulation differ markedly across these 
three periods (see, e.g., Prasad and Wei, 2007, for the case of China). The first three 
columns of Table 3 show the average annual increase in foreign exchange reserves during 
each of these periods and the breakdown of this increase into the main components. The 
next two columns show the changes in these averages across periods. 
 
The rate of reserve accumulation was higher by an average of $17 billion per year in the 
second period relative to the first. The current account balance shifted from an average 
deficit of $4 billion per year in the first period to a surplus of $2 billion per year in the 
second period, implying that the current account contributed about $6 billion to the 
increase in the rate of reserve accumulation in the second period compared to the first. The 
change in the non-FDI capital account balance, which mainly constitutes portfolio flows, 
accounts for most of the remainder. 
 
During 2006-08, the rate of reserve accumulation jumps by a further $57 billion per year 
relative to the preceding period. The forces driving the reserve buildup in this period are 
very different from the previous period. The current account switches back into a deficit, 
resulting in a negative contribution of nearly $16 billion per year from the current account. 
FDI and valuation changes account for $9 billion and $13 billion, respectively. The latter 
factor represents an increase in the dollar value of reserve assets held in currencies other 
than dollars as a consequence of the significant depreciation of the dollar against other 
major reserve currencies during this period. The big story during the last two years has 
clearly been the surge in portfolio inflows and various other debt inflows, which together 
meant that the non-FDI capital account balance contributed nearly $51 billion per year to 
the faster pace of reserve accumulation during this period.  
 
To better understand the implications of these patterns in the balance of payments, it is 
important to examine in more detail the structure of inflows and external liabilities.  
   14 
V. Composition of Gross Flows and External Liabilities 
 
I now provide a disaggregated perspective on India’s de facto financial integration. As 
discussed in the review of the academic literature in Section II, the costs and benefits of 
financial openness are crucially dependent on the nature of financial integration. In this 
section, I review the composition of India’s capital inflows and outflows, the structure of 
its external liabilities, and the implications for the benefit-cost trade-off. 
 
V.1 Gross Flows 
 
Table 4 indicates that gross inflows have risen sharply since the early 2000s, from an 
average level of about 2 percent of GDP over the previous decade, to nearly 9 percent in 
2007-08. The shares of the components of gross inflows fluctuate markedly from year to 
year and it is difficult to detect any clear trends over the full sample of data. Focusing on 
the last four years, it is clear that FDI and portfolio inflows have together become a major 
constituent of overall inflows. The trend in outflows, which still remain at very low levels 
(2 percent of GDP in 2007-08), is much clearer, with FDI accounting for the lions’ share of 
outflows in recent years and portfolio flows barely registering on the scale. 
 
V.2 Composition of External Liabilities 
 
As discussed earlier, stocks of external liabilities are more reliable measures of the benefits 
that emerging markets can potentially attain from financial integration, and also the 
potential risks. For this part of the analysis, we turn again to the dataset of Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Figure 4 shows that the ratio of FDI and portfolio liabilities in gross 
external liabilities risen steadily, from a level below 10 percent in the early 1990s to 60 
percent at present. Based on the discussion in Section II about the relative merits of 
different forms of capital, this is clearly a positive development.  
 
Figure 5, which provides a cross-country comparison of this ratio for emerging markets, 
shows that India is now in the middle of the pack and not too far off the level of the   15 
leading country. Indeed, India has moved up quite significantly from its position near the 
bottom of this cross-country distribution in 1995. It is also interesting to note that the 
dispersion of this ratio across emerging markets has decreased considerably over the past 
decade. This is of course consistent with other evidence that the composition of private 
capital flows to emerging markets has shifted markedly towards FDI and portfolio flows in 
recent years.
8 Thus, in India, as in most other emerging markets, the structure of external 
liabilities has become quite favorable in terms of attaining the risk sharing and TFP growth 
benefits of financial openness.  
 
V.3 Structure of External Debt 
 
One component of foreign liabilities that is of particular interest is the stock of external 
debt. The size of the stock of short-term external debt denominated in foreign currencies 
has been identified as an important factor triggering many emerging market financial crises 
of the last two decades. Moreover, short-term debt flows tend to be highly procyclical and 
so do the financing terms for these flows (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2004). 
Consequently, countries that rely to a great extent on short-term foreign-currency debt face 
a double whammy when they are hit with negative shocks and when external financing is 
in principle even more important to smooth domestic consumption.  
 
India has taken a cautious approach to allowing the accumulation of foreign-currency 
denominated external debt, resulting in a low level of vulnerability on this front. The ratio 
of external debt to GDP has fallen from levels of around 38 percent in the early 1990s to 
under 20 percent in the last five years (see Table 5). The share of short-term debt in total 
external debt has risen to 20 percent, although this number should be interpreted with some 
caution as there appears to be a discontinuity in the split between short- and long-term debt 
                                                 
8 Kose et al. (2006) report that, in 2000-04, debt accounted for about 52 percent of gross external 
liabilities of emerging markets, while FDI accounted for 37 percent. Portfolio equity liabilities 
accounted for most of the remainder. Back in 1980-84, the corresponding shares for debt and FDI 
were 85 percent and 14 percent, respectively.   16 
in 2005. Between 2005 and 2008, the share of short-term debt in total debt has risen by 
nearly 7 percentage points, so the trend is clear at any rate.  
 
With the opening up to capital inflows, the share of deposits by Indians who live abroad 
and other foreign currency deposits in total debt rose from 12 percent in the early 1990s to 
28 percent in 2004, before declining to 20 percent by 2008. External commercial 
borrowings by corporates have risen to about 28 percent of total debt, from about 12 
percent in the early 1990s.  
 
Consider adding together three elements of the debt structure that could represent potential 
flight capital--foreign currency deposits, external commercial borrowings and short-term 
debt. If one adds all of these together, for 2007 the total amounts to about 13 percent of 
GDP. Some authors such as Williamson (2007) have expressed concerns that the 
liberalization of debt inflows may bode ill for India. The levels of debt are not high enough 
to warrant significant concern, although of course one could make the legitimate argument 
that this relatively benign outcome is because the government has limited external 
commercial borrowings and short-term debt. The problem is that it is now relatively 
straightforward to evade controls on this type of flow by bringing in capital as portfolio 
equity and swapping it for other instruments (including over-the-counter debt instruments).  
 
In any event, the surge in external commercial borrowings does bear further consideration. 
Given the practically nonexistent domestic corporate debt market, firms interested in 
issuing debt may have been pushed to issue debt abroad. Moreover, the RBI’s attempts to 
resist exchange rate appreciation during 2006-07 may in fact have created incentives for 
firms to seek capital abroad using debt denominated in foreign currencies. Firms may have 
been using this financing instrument to effectively place bets on an eventual currency 
appreciation. Thus, rather than viewing foreign debt as the problem to be dealt with, it 
would be more appropriate to think about aspects of the financial system and macro 
policies that may be creating incentives for firms to obtain financing through foreign-
currency debt. I will return to this theme in the concluding section.  
   17 
VI. Does India Have Enough Reserves? 
 
In determining a country’s vulnerability to external shocks, the structure of external assets 
and liabilities is an important indicator. I now examine the evolution of India’s official 
international investment position (IIP) and its implications for India’s financial openness.
9 
The IIP effectively represents a country’s balance sheet vis a vis the rest of the world. 
Table 6 shows that, at the end of financial year 2007-08, India had a net negative IIP 
position of $53 billion. This represents a significant improvement from the level of minus 
$81 billion in 1996-97, just before the Asian financial crisis. The stock of external assets 
has grown six-fold from $62 billion in 2000-01 to $381 billion in 2007-08. A substantial 
portion of this stock is accounted for by reserves. At the end of FY 2007-08, the total stock 
of reserve assets was $310 billion, of which foreign exchange reserves amounted to $299 
billion.  
 
From an insurance perspective, the adequacy of the stock of foreign exchange reserves is 
typically measured relative to a country’s imports or level of short-term external debt. 
Table 7 shows that, by both these measures, India has more than adequate reserves. Even 
as of 2007, reserves were sufficient to cover more than a year’s worth of imports, well 
above the conventional threshold of six months of imports. Moreover, reserves even 
exceed the level of total external debt; recall that short-term debt is only 20 percent of  
external debt (Table 5), so reserves are many multiples of the level of short-term external 
debt.  
 
From the perspective of capital account liberalization, an even more stringent criterion than 
the coverage of external debt is whether reserves cover a major portion of the stock of all 
non-FDI foreign liabilities, on the assumption that all liabilities other than FDI are 
                                                 
9 Due to some differences in how valuation effects are computed for various components of 
external assets and liabilities, there are some discrepancies between the values of these stocks in 
the official IIP data and the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) dataset. These discrepancies have 
grown in the last few years as the stocks have increased, along with the magnitude of fluctuations 
in the value of the U.S. dollar. Hence, I use the official IIP data here but have used the Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti in other sections to facilitate international comparisons.    18 
relatively liquid and could fly out of a country at short notice. The IIP numbers show that, 
at the end of 2007-08, India’s foreign exchange reserves ($299 billion) were nearly 
adequate to cover its entire stock of non-FDI liabilities, which amounted to $318 billion.  
 
A different criterion suggested by some authors is whether reserves are sufficient to cover 
a significant portion of a broad monetary aggregate such as M2.
10 Demand deposits and 
currency can in principle flee a country at short notice; protecting the economy from the 
financial instability that could arise from such an event could be an important benchmark 
for policymakers to gauge a “safe” level of reserves. By this criterion, India, like many 
other emerging market economies (including China) does not have an excessively high 
level of reserves. The last column of Table 7 shows that India’s reserves cover about 30 
percent of an even broader aggregate M3. This is a large share but obviously not enough to 
offset a complete financial collapse and the accompanying loss of confidence in the 
domestic banking system. Given the relative prudence of the RBI and the large banks 
themselves, this seems a highly unlikely scenario.
11  
 
The basic conclusion of this section is that India has accumulated a level of foreign 
exchange reserves that exceeds most standard norms of reserve adequacy from an 
insurance perspective. Indeed, the fact that India has accumulated an additional $110 
billion of reserves during 2007-8 makes this picture look even more benign than indicated 
by the ratios in Table 7. The traditional risks faced by emerging markets with open capital 
accounts—sudden stops or reversals of capital flows—are therefore not a major concern. 
Nevertheless, there is clearly an important difference relative to China, which has been 
                                                 
10 Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2008) argue that concerns about domestic financial stability 
could be a key motive for the massive amount of reserve accumulation by emerging market 
economies in recent years. Given their current levels of imports and external debt, the levels of 
reserves in many of these countries are well above those that could be justified on precautionary 
grounds based on these standard criteria. These authors find that a model that includes the ratio of 
M2 to GDP does a much better job of fitting cross-country variations in reserve levels.  
11 Indian banks, both private and public, are well capitalized and the ratio of  nonperforming loans 
to total deposits in the banking system is estimated to be less than 2 percent.    19 
accumulating reserves at a hectic pace through current account as well as capital account 
surpluses.  
 
While China is running a current account surplus in excess of 12 percent of GDP, India 
registered a current account deficit of 1.5 percent in 2007-08. Is India vulnerable on this 
dimension? Since foreign exchange reserves amount to about a quarter of GDP, a sudden 
stop of capital inflows by itself isn’t going to create major problems for financing the 
current account deficit. Moreover, as recent developments have indicated, the RBI is 
willing to let the rupee depreciate quite significantly to prevent the current account deficit 
from rising. Nevertheless, current account deficits that reflect consumption booms have 
often ended disastrously—is this a risk for India? On this score, there isn’t a strong case for 
concern. Figure 6 shows that both the national savings and investment rates have been 
rising since the early 2000s, although the investment rate has risen a little faster, 
accounting for the current account deficit. Thus, India seems to fit the textbook example of 
a developing country borrowing from abroad to finance investment as its capital to labor 
ratio is low and its productivity growth is high relative to its major trading partners.
12  
 
One aspect in common with China is the risk of a banking crisis—a significant tremor in 
the banking system may trigger a surge of outflow of deposits from the banking system 
and into foreign currency assets (see Prasad, 2008). Accumulating enough reserves to deal 
with this potential source of financial instability may seem prudent. But the costs of 
accumulating such a large stock of reserves—especially in terms of the other distortions in 
the system needed to maintain a rapid pace of accumulation—implies that this insurance 
may have costly welfare consequences. On the other hand, a different—and less 
sanguine—perspective comes from the rapid loss of nearly $50 billion worth of reserves in 
recent weeks as the global financial turmoil led to a flight to quality (and out of emerging 
markets, including India) and the RBI sought to slow down a sharp depreciation of the 
rupee. I will return to this issue in the concluding section.  
                                                 
12 Bosworth and Collins (2008) conduct a growth accounting exercise for India and China. They 
conclude that India has in recent years been experiencing higher productivity growth than most 
industrial countries (but less than China).    20 
VII. India’s Position in the International Financial System 
 
With its strong growth prospects, India will remain an attractive destination for capital 
inflows once global financial markets settle down. And its emergence as an economic 
power will mean that the economy is likely to continue to export private capital. But what 
forms these inflows and outflows take will of course determine the effects on 
macroeconomic outcomes. While such prognostications are difficult, a first step is to 
evaluate how much of various types of flows to emerging markets can be accounted for by 
India. For this exercise, I use IMF data on total gross inflows into and outflows from all 
emerging markets and other developing countries. This includes not just flows between 
these countries and advanced industrial economies but also flows amongst these countries 
themselves.  
 
Figure 7 shows India’s share in total gross flows to emerging markets and other developing 
countries. This share was just 2 percent in 1997 but shot up to 8 percent in 1998, the 
second year of the Asian financial crisis, mainly because the overall quantum of flows to 
emerging markets shrank substantially and economies like China and India that were not 
devastated by the crisis got more of whatever flows there were. The share has averaged 
about 5 percent during the 2000s and has been quite stable. India’s share of FDI has been 
quite low over the last decade and inched up to just over 4 percent in 2006. Likewise, 
India’s share of portfolio flows to non-industrial countries hit 12 percent in a couple of 
years (2001 and 2003) but has otherwise been rather low, amounting to only 4 percent in 
2006 (based on the strong portfolio inflows in 2007-08, it has no doubt gone up by at least 
a couple of percentage points).  
 
In parallel with the inflows it has been receiving, India has of course been investing 
abroad. Encouraged by the RBI’s easing of restrictions on outward FDI, Indian corporates 
have ramped up these flows, which now account for more than 6 percent of total gross FDI 
flows emanating from all non-industrial countries (including flows going to other emerging 
markets). The share of portfolio flows, by contrast, has remained at minuscule levels.  
   21 
Its low share of total inflows into emerging markets suggests that, despite its growth story, 
India has a considerable way to go in terms of even obtaining a significant share of total 
flows to non-industrial countries. It also suggests that, unless there is a fundamental shift in 
the structures of world financial markets, there could be a lot more capital coming into 
India if growth prospects remain strong and other international investors “discover” it.
13 
Factors that could lure more capital into India include its relatively high productivity 
growth, well-developed equity markets, and the profit opportunities from rising income 
levels and a rapidly expanding domestic market.  
 
At the same time, India’s growth is also likely to unleash resources that will result in more 
capital outflows. As household income levels rise, the demand for international portfolio 
diversification will increase. Indian institutional investors will also be looking for a wider 
range of investment opportunities, both domestically and abroad, as their asset pools 
increase. And Indian companies will almost certainly continue to expand their reach 
abroad.  
 
The net implication is that there are powerful forces that will impel a substantially higher 
degree of integration into international financial markets, with capital controls becoming 
increasingly irrelevant even if they remain on the books. Given India’s financial structure 
and changes in the structure of international financial flows, much of this integration is 
likely to take the form of inflows and outflows of FDI and portfolio equity, which would of 
course be a favorable outcome. But it is likely that it will become increasingly difficult to 
bottle up specific types of flows if the economic incentives favoring them are powerful 
enough. In that case, the best that macroeconomic policies can do is to foster 
macroeconomic and financial stability, which could serve to promote the right kinds of 
flows in both directions.  
 
                                                 
13 Patnaik and Shah (2008) note that India’s actual weight in the global equity portfolio is only 
about one-sixth the predicted weight that India should have according to a standard international 
capital asset pricing model (ICAPM). This is in fact an improvement relative to 2001, when the 
actual weight was only about one-tenth the predicted weight (and, of course, India’s ICAPM 
weight has risen substantially--almost four-fold--from 2001 to 2007).   22 
VIII. Implications for Policies Towards Capital Account Liberalization 
 
India has moved slowly and steadily towards capital account convertibility. The capital 
account has become quite open and restrictions on both inflows and outflows have been 
eased significantly over time.
14 Nevertheless, there is a residual element of government 
control that is maintained on many types of flows—sometimes as modest as registration 
requirements on foreign investors but also some as onerous as virtually keeping foreign 
investors out of the government debt market. These elements are part of a strategy of 
cautious and calibrated capital account liberalization that has served India well in at least 
one dimension—reducing its vulnerability to crises.  
 
In terms of overall de facto financial integration, India has come a long way and has 
experienced significant volumes of inflows and outflows in recent years. Relative to the 
size of its economy, however, these flows are rather modest, putting India at the low end of 
the distribution of de facto financial integration measures in an international comparison 
across emerging market economies.  
 
The RBI’s calibrated approach to capital account opening has resulted in a preponderance 
of FDI and portfolio liabilities in India’s stock of gross external liabilities. All elements of 
the literature point to this as being a favorable outcome in terms of improving the benefit-
risk tradeoff of financial openness. But at the same time the limited degree of openness has 
probably limited the indirect benefits that seem to accrue from financial integration.  
 
The recent global financial turmoil suggests that a high degree of caution is warranted in 
further opening of the capital account. The question is where to strike the balance—this is 
a judgment call as the benefits of caution need to be weighed against the possibility that 
excessive caution in further capital account opening may be holding back financial sector 
reforms and reducing the independence and effectiveness of monetary policy.  
                                                 
14 For a chronology, see Bery and Singh (2006). Patnaik and Shah (2008) discuss a few recent steps 
towards more openness, some remaining restrictions, and their consequences.    23 
One of the main concerns about capital account liberalization is that it makes exchange rate 
management harder. Some authors have argued that opening of India’s capital account 
should be resisted as that would make it harder to maintain an undervalued exchange rate 
and thereby promote export-led growth (e.g., Bhalla, 2007; Subramanian, 2007). Although 
India does not have a formal exchange rate target, the Indian rupee has been managed to 
varying degrees at different times. Even though the nominal exchange rate relative to the 
U.S. dollar has fluctuated over a wide range in the last decade (Figure 8), the effective 
exchange rate—measured in either nominal or real terms—has been managed within a 
much narrower range (Figure 9). Has this constrained the independence of monetary 
policy, which now involves a mix between inflation and exchange rate objectives? The 
RBI does in fact seem to have an implicit medium-term inflation objective (or at least a 
tolerance level) but also focuses on the exchange rate when needed. As recent events have 
indicated, this has made the central bank more susceptible to political pressures and might 
have made it harder for the RBI to manage inflationary pressures.
15 
 
Resisting exchange rate appreciation has resulted in large costs of sterilizing inflows that 
are recycled into foreign exchange reserves, which are usually held in low-yield industrial 
country government bonds. Figure 10, which shows the interest rate differential between 
Indian and U.S. government securities, drives home this point. The stock of sterilization 
bonds (Market Stabilization Bonds) also rose sharply during 2006 and 2007 (Figure 11), 
implying that the quasi-fiscal costs of the RBI’s sterilization operations have mounted 
rapidly. Clearly, tight exchange rate management is difficult as the capital becomes more 
open in de facto terms over time. This is also evident in developments since the summer of 
2008--the RBI has been unable to hold back pressures for the exchange rate to depreciate 
significantly despite large-scale intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
 
The Rajan Committee report (2008) makes the point that monetary policy would be far 
more effective if it was focused on the objective of a low and stable inflation rate. Indeed, 
                                                 
15 Some authors such as Panagariya (2008, see Chapter 10) argue forcefully that the RBI has in fact 
been very successful with its “pragmatic” approach to monetary and exchange rate policies, 
delivering a high rate of GDP growth as well as low inflation.    24 
the evidence suggests that making an inflation objective the key priority of monetary 
policy would be the best contribution that monetary policy can make to stabilizing 
domestic business cycles, maintaining financial stability, and even reducing exchange rate 
volatility (Rose, 2006). An implication of this literature is that maintaining capital controls 
as a device to try and manage the exchange rate better could weaken overall monetary 
policy implementation and credibility, especially in terms of managing inflation 
expectations. 
 
One key issue is whether India falls below the threshold conditions that seem to make a big 
difference to the benefit-risk tradeoff of financial openness. Kose, Prasad and Taylor 
(2008) report that, while it is difficult to precisely identify the critical levels of the 
threshold conditions that influence the outcomes of financial openness, there are a few 
general propositions that do come out of the analysis for particular countries such as India. 
Given India’s level of financial and institutional development, the accumulation of FDI 
and portfolio equity liabilities is relatively “safe” as the levels of these two thresholds for 
such liabilities are rather low. As for debt accumulation, India is moving towards the 
threshold in terms of financial development but is not there yet.  
 
Another important threshold condition is related to trade integration. Many authors have 
found that greater openness to trade not only reduces the risks of financial crises but also 
makes it easier for a country to recover quickly if it does get hit by a crisis (see, e.g., 
Frankel and Cavallo, 2004, and references therein). On this dimension, it is encouraging 
that there has been a rapid increase in India’s external trade, with the standard trade 
openness measure (ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP) nearly doubling from 
its level of 25 percent in 2000 (see Figure 12).  
 
Thus, in terms of the collateral benefits-thresholds framework, India is a good example of 
a country where the benefit-risk tradeoff of further capital account is finely balanced. It 
turns out that there is another important threshold condition, which is the level of financial 
integration itself. Countries that are more integrated into international financial markets   25 
seem to achieve better risk sharing outcomes and also seem to suffer few ill effects of even 
a stock of external liabilities that is tilted towards more debt.  
 
A specific recommendation of the Rajan Committee (2008) is that allowing foreign 
investors to invest in government bonds could improve the liquidity and depth of this 
market. A deep and well-functioning government bond market is a prerequisite for serving 
as a benchmark for pricing corporate bonds, which could allow that market to develop. By 
providing an additional source of debt financing, it would create some room for the 
government to reduce the financing burden it currently imposes on banks through the 
statutory liquidity ratio—the requirement that banks hold a certain portion of their deposits 
in government bonds. And it might even have the beneficial effect of imposing some 
discipline on fiscal policy since foreign investors could pull out and raise the cost of debt 
financing if the government budget deficit were to start rising again.  
 
An opportunistic approach to liberalization of outflows during a period of surging inflows 
would also help attain multiple objectives. If undertaken in a controlled manner along the 
lines suggested by Prasad and Rajan (2008), it would generate a variety of collateral 
benefits—sterilization of inflows, securities market development, international portfolio 
diversification for households—without the risks of a full and irrevocable opening of the 
taps for outflows. During the recent financial turmoil in world capital markets, the RBI has 
indeed taken an opportunistic approach to liberalizing inflows by raising ceilings on 
external commercial borrowings in order to compensate for capital outflows.  
 
Panagariya notes (2008) that liberalizing all types of short-term flows in a precipitous 
manner could heighten the risk of financial crisis, which in turn would put paid to a whole 
host of other essential reforms. Williamson (2007) argues that India may have liberalized 
its capital account too quickly and that it should slow down the process noting, in 
particular, that liberalizing debt flows could be risky and would have few benefits. In short, 
while there is an emerging consensus--that more openness (eventually) is good for the   26 
Indian economy but that the capital account should not be opened at one fell swoop--there 









                                                 
16 The reports of the Mistry Committee (2007) and Rajan Committee (2008) lay out a fairly 
aggressive timetable, noting the large benefits that could be gained from financial openness, 
including how it could foster more effective monetary policy and boost financial sector reforms. 
The Tarapore Committee (2006) recommends a much slower pace of liberalization. Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) note that capital account liberalization can also be useful as a framework for 
building consensus around reforms and for thwarting coalitions that try to block reforms.    27 
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 Table 1. De Jure Capital Account Openness 
 
Full Sample India China
Median Minimum Median  Maximum
Chinn Ito
1985 -1.13 -1.80 -1.13 2.54 -1.13 -1.13
1995 -0.09 -1.80 -0.09 2.54 -1.13 -1.13
2006 0.14 -1.13 0.03 2.54 -1.13 -1.13
Edwards
1985 50.00 12.50 37.50 75.00 25.00 37.50
1995 75.00 25.00 50.00 100.00 25.00 37.50
2000 81.25 37.50 62.50 100.00 75.00 37.50
Miniane
1985 0.86 0.83 0.86 1.00 0.83
1995 0.43 0.71 0.86 1.00 0.83





Note: The Chinn-Ito index goes from -2.54 to 2.54, with a higher number indicating a 
more open capital account. The Edwards index goes from 0 to 100, with a higher number 
indicating a more open capital account. The Miniane index goes from 0 to 1, with a lower 
number indicating a more open capital account.  
 

















 Table 2. The Balance of Payments 
(in billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09*
Gross international reserves 29.7 33.2 38.7 42.9 54.7 76.1 113.0 141.5 151.6 199.2 309.7 312.1
(in percent of GDP) 7.2 8.0 8.6 9.3 11.4 15.0 18.8 20.3 18.8 21.6 27.2
Change in international reserves 2.9 3.5 5.5 4.2 11.8 21.4 36.9 28.5 10.1 47.6 110.5 2.4
    A. Current account balance -5.5 -4.0 -4.7 -2.7 3.4 6.3 14.1 -2.5 -9.9 -9.8 -17.4 -10.7
        (in percent of GDP) -1.3 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 0.7 1.2 2.3 -0.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.5
          Merchandise trade balance -15.5 -13.2 -17.8 -12.5 -11.6 -10.7 -13.7 -33.7 -51.9 -63.2 -90.1 -31.6
         (in percent of GDP) -3.8 -3.2 -4.0 -2.7 -2.4 -2.1 -2.3 -4.8 -6.4 -6.8 -7.9    
    B. Capital account balance 9.8 8.4 10.4 8.8 8.6 10.8 16.7 28.0 25.5 45.8 108.0 13.2
           FDI, net 3.5 2.4 2.1 3.3 4.7 3.2 2.4 3.7 3.0 8.5 15.5 10.1
           portfolio flows, net 1.8 -0.1 3.0 2.6 2.0 0.9 11.4 9.3 12.5 7.1 29.3 -4.2
 
    C. Errors and omissions, net 0.2 -0.2 0.7 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.6 0.6 -0.5 0.6 1.5 -0.3
    D. Valuation change -1.6 -0.7 -0.9 -1.7 0.0 4.5 5.5 2.4 -5.0 11.0 18.4 0.2
Memorandum Items:  
Non-FDI capital account balance
  (including errors and omissions) 6.5 5.9 9.0 5.3 3.6 7.4 14.9 24.9 22.0 37.9 94.0 2.8
Nominal GDP 410.0 414.0 450.0 460.0 478.0 508.0 602.0 696.0 806.0 922.7 1140.0
 
 
Sources: CEIC, RBI and author's calculations. 
 
Notes: The data for 2008-09 are end June data.The non-FDI capital account balance is the capital account balance minus net FDI plus 
net errors and omissions.1998-2001 2001-06 2006-08 2001-06 2006-08
 -1998-2001  -2001-06
(1) (2) (3) (2) - (1) (3) - (2)
Increase in foreign reserves 4.4 21.7 79.1 17.3 57.3
   Current account balance -3.8 2.3 -13.6 6.1 -15.9
   
   Capital account balance 9.2 17.9 76.9 8.7 59.0
        FDI, net 2.6 3.4 12.0 0.8 8.6
 
   Errors and omissions, net 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.0 1.0
Valuation Changes -1.1 1.5 14.7 2.6 13.2
Non-FDI capital account balance
  (including errors and omissions) 6.7 14.6 66.0 7.8 51.4
Sources: CEIC, RBI and author's calculations.
Notes: The non-FDI capital account balance is the capital account balance minus net FDI plus
net errors and omissions. 
Table 3.  A Decomposition of the Recent Reserve Buildup
(in billions of U.S. dollars)
Annual averages Changes
 Table 4. Composition of Gross Inflows and Gross Outflows 
 
Inflows 
FDI Portfolio Loans Other
(USD billions) (percent of GDP)
1995-96 7.8 2.1 27.6 34.3 28.4 9.6
1996-97 13.6 3.5 20.9 24.4 35.3 19.4
1997-98 14.0 3.3 25.4 13.1 34.3 27.2
1998-99 10.8 2.5 23.0 -0.6 41.0 36.7
1999-00 10.8 2.4 20.0 28.0 14.8 37.2
2000-01 14.9 3.2 27.0 18.5 35.3 19.2
2001-02 9.2 1.9 66.7 22.0 -13.7 25.0
2002-03 4.0 0.8 125.7 24.4 -96.1 46.0
2003-04 16.3 2.8 26.4 69.5 -26.7 30.8
2004-05 35.4 5.1 16.9 26.3 30.9 25.9
2005-06 35.2 4.3 25.3 35.4 22.4 16.9
2006-07 61.3 6.7 35.9 11.4 40.1 12.6
2007-08 98.1 8.6 18.3 33.5 28.9 19.3
Gross Inflows Components




FDI Portfolio Loans Other
(USD billions) (percent of GDP)
1995-96 3.5 0.9 5.4 0.2 94.4
1996-97 3.1 0.8 6.1 0.0 93.9
1997-98 2.5 0.6 1.5 0.4 98.0
1998-99 2.9 0.7 3.4 0.5 96.0
1999-00 2.9 0.6 2.5 -0.3 97.8
2000-01 3.5 0.8 21.6 4.8 0.6 72.9
2001-02 3.1 0.6 45.4 2.3 2.7 49.6
2002-03 3.1 0.6 57.9 1.1 0.7 40.2
2003-04 4.3 0.7 44.9 0.0 2.3 52.7
2004-05 6.8 1.0 33.5 0.4 4.9 61.2
2005-06 10.9 1.3 53.9 0.0 2.9 43.2
2006-07 17.5 1.9 77.0 -0.3 1.8 21.5
2007-08 26.0 2.3 64.6 -0.6 0.1 35.9
Components




Note: Prior to 2000-01, outward FDI and portfolio outflows were not reported separately. 
 





















1990 75.9 26.7 90.1 9.9 25.3 17.9 2.0 6.1 12.3 12.0 14.5
1991 83.8 28.6 89.8 10.2 24.9 16.9 3.1 5.1 12.2 12.2 15.3
1992 85.3 38.6 91.7 8.3 27.1 18.1 4.0 4.7 13.7 11.8 12.2
1993 90.0 37.3 93.0 7.0 27.8 17.9 5.3 4.8 12.9 12.4 11.8
1994 92.7 33.5 96.1 3.9 28.3 18.8 5.4 5.6 13.3 13.7 10.9
1995 99.0 30.7 95.7 4.3 28.8 20.5 4.3 6.7 13.1 12.5 9.7
1996 93.7 26.9 94.6 5.4 30.5 20.5 2.5 5.7 14.8 11.7 8.8
1997 93.5 24.4 92.8 7.2 31.3 18.7 1.4 6.3 15.3 11.8 8.0
1998 93.5 24.2 94.6 5.4 31.6 18.1 0.7 7.0 18.2 12.7 6.3
1999 96.9 23.5 95.6 4.4 31.5 18.1 0.3 7.0 21.7 12.2 4.9
2000 98.3 22.0 96.0 4.0 32.0 18.5 0.0 6.9 20.3 13.8 4.5
2001 101.3 22.5 96.4 3.6 30.7 15.8 0.0 5.8 24.1 16.4 3.7
2002 98.8 21.2 97.2 2.8 32.3 15.5 0.0 5.4 23.6 17.4 3.1
2003 104.9 20.3 95.5 4.5 28.6 16.0 0.0 4.8 21.4 22.1 2.7
2004 111.6 17.8 96.0 4.0 26.2 15.5 0.0 4.2 19.7 28.0 2.4
2005 133.0 18.5 86.7 13.3 23.9 12.8 0.0 3.8 19.9 24.6 1.7
2006 138.1 17.2 85.9 14.1 23.6 11.4 0.0 3.9 19.1 26.3 1.5
2007 169.7 17.8 84.5 15.5 20.8 9.5 0.0 4.2 24.6 24.3 1.1
2008 221.2 18.8 80.0 20.0 17.8 8.9 0.0 4.6 28.0 19.7 0.9
(as percent  of total debt)
Total By Maturity Composition of Long Term Debt
 
 
Note: 2005 onwards, Short term debt is the difference between the total and long term debt. 
 
Source: CEIC, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India and author’s calculations. 
   Table 6. India’s International Investment Position 
(in billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
Net Position -81 -81 -79 -77 -76 -69 -60 -47 -54 -60 -62 -53
A. Assets 38 42 47 55 62 74 96 136 166 184 246 381
1. FDI 11223468 1 0 1 6 2 9 4 6
2. Portfolio 000011100111
     Equity 000000000111
     Debt 000000000000
3. Other investment 10 11 12 14 16 14 13 15 14 15 16 25
4. Reserve assets 27 30 33 39 43 55 76 113 142 152 199 310
     Foreign exchange reserves 22 26 30 35 40 51 72 107 136 145 192 299
B. Liabilities 119 122 126 132 139 143 156 183 220 244 308 434
1. FDI 11 14 15 18 20 25 31 38 44 52 76 116
2. Portfolio 19 20 23 25 31 32 32 44 56 64 79 119
     Equity 14 14 13 16 17 19 20 34 43 55 63 98
     Debt 5 61 0 91 41 31 210 13 10 16 21
3. Other investment 89 88 87 89 87 86 92 101 119 128 152 199
 
 






 Table  7. Reserve Adequacy 









1992 0.1 3.3 0.1
1993 0.2 6.6 0.1
1994 0.2 7.6 0.1
1995 0.2 4.8 0.1
1996 0.2 0.2 6.0 0.1
1997 0.2 0.3 6.7 0.1
1998 0.3 0.3 6.7 0.1
1999 0.3 0.4 6.9 0.1
2000 0.3 0.4 7.4 0.1
2001 0.4 0.5 9.6 0.2
2002 0.6 0.7 10.8 0.2
2003 0.7 0.9 12.6 0.2
2004 0.8 1.0 11.4 0.3
2005 0.8 1.1 9.5 0.2
2006 0.9 1.1 9.6 0.3
2007 0.9 1.4 12.5 0.3
 
 
                      Source: CEIC, RBI and author’s calculations. 
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            Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) dataset and author’s calculations. Figure 3. Foreign Exchange Reserves: Flows and Stocks 




















           Note: The data in this figure go through August 2008.            
 






















 Figure 4. Share of FDI and Portfolio Liabilities 
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      Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) dataset and author’s calculations. 
 










































































           Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) dataset and author’s calculations. Figure 6. The Savings-Investment Balance 






































          Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) Figure 7. India’s Share of Gross Inflows to and Outflows from Emerging 
Markets and Other Developing Countries 
 













                    


















        Note: The top panel shows the volume of gross inflows into India in specific categories  
of capital flows as a ratio of the corresponding total gross inflows into all emerging 
markets and other developing countries. The denominator includes flows amongst 
emerging markets and other developing countries since these are counted as part of 
gross inflows of the recipient countries. The bottom panel shows India’s share of total 
gross outflows from all emerging markets and other developing countries (including to 
other countries within this group). 
          
         Source: CEIC, Global Financial Stability Report 2008 and author’s calculations. 














         Note: The data in this figure are up to November 2008. 
 




























Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08
REER NEER
 
            Notes: The effective exchange rates here are trade-weighted and measured  
            against 36 currencies.  
             
            REER =100 (1993-94), NEER =100 (1993-94) 
 



































         Note: The data in this figure go through August 2008.         
 























 Figure 11. Outstanding Stock of Market Stabilization Bonds 
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            Note: This figure shows the sum of imports and exports of goods and services as a 
ratio to GDP. 
           
            Source: CEIC and authors’ calculations. 